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Abstract This paper describes an exploratory investigation into the feasibil-
ity of predictive analytics of user behavioural data as a possible aid in devel-
oping effective user models for adaptive cybersecurity. Partial Least Squares
Structural Equation Modelling (PLS-SEM) is applied to the domain of cy-
bersecurity by collecting data on users’ attitude towards digital security, and
analysing how that influences their adoption and usage of technological se-
curity controls. Bayesian-network modeling is then applied to integrate the
behavioural variables with simulated sensory data from the web browser and
other empirical data gathered to support personalized adaptive cybersecurity
decision-making. Results from the empirical study show that predictive ana-
lytics is feasible in the context of behavioural cybersecurity, and can aid in
the generation of useful heuristics for the design and development of adaptive
cybersecurity mechanisms. Predictive analytics can also aid in encoding dig-
ital security behavioural knowledge that can support the adaptation and/or
automation of operations in the domain of cybersecurity. The experimental re-
sults demonstrate the effectiveness of the techniques applied to extract input
data for the Bayesian-based models for personalized adaptive cybersecurity
assistance.
Keywords Cybersecurity · Behavioural analytics · Predictive modelling ·
Bayesian-inference · Adaptive assistance
J.H. Addae, X. Sun and D. Towey
Faculty of Science and Engineering, University of Nottingham Ningbo China, Ningbo, China.
E-mail: Xu.Sun@nottingham.edu.cn
M. Radenkovic
School of Computer Science, University of Nottingham, UK.
2 Joyce H. Addae et al.
1 Introduction
The need to understand users within any human-computer system has long
been identified as a critical design principle by HCI researchers and profes-
sionals. In recent years, there has been an increasing interest in the role users
play in maintaining security within the digital economy. The adoption and ap-
propriate usage of security mechanisms by home computer users (hereinafter
referred to as users or HCUs) in particular have become a central concern for
the usable security research community. Howe et al. (2012) described HCUs
users as people who have not received any formal training to use computers
but use them to support various tasks in non-work environments. Despite ad-
vances in cybersecurity technological solutions, most HCUs are still unable to
effectively access them for the protection of their digital assets. As HCUs are
increasingly targeted in security breaches (Crossler and Be´langer, 2014), there
is a consensus among both cybersecurity researchers and key industry players
about the urgent need to understand their cybersecurity behaviours and how
best to enhance them.
To the same degree that efforts are being geared towards the security of cy-
berspaces, the need exist to equally make cybersecurity mechanisms accessible
to the average user. People need to improve their security practices regularly
which means they must be willing to learn and adopt the best security poli-
cies, and the mechanisms to ensure those policies. The National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) suggests that the best way of involving ev-
erybody is to create incentives that can motivate everybody within the cyber
economy (Schwartz, 2011). Several usability studies on different types of se-
curity controls (e.g. firewalls, anti-virus) have illustrated how usability issues
prevent end users from effectively leveraging them for their protection against
security attacks (Cheung et al., 2001; Wong, 2008). Furnell and Clarke (2012)
touched on anti-virus software usability and pointed out that users are faced
with more complex interfaces due to the new trend of integrated internet secu-
rity suits. Thus the consequent burden of understanding the full set of security
functionalities provided through the surrounding options in web browsers has
increased.
A reasonable assumption is that improved usability of cybersecurity mech-
anisms can serve as a major incentive for users to adopt better security controls
and behaviour online. However, adoption of security systems remains problem-
atic partially as a result of security researchers focusing less on the usability of
systems within their social context (Church, 2008). It is becoming increasingly
difficult to ignore the impact of individual differences and other socio-cultural
variables when applying usable security design heuristics. Adaptive and/or
personalised user interaction design have been proposed as possible ways of
addressing usability and acceptability issues related to different user domain
and contexts (Akiki et al., 2015; Mezhoudi et al., 2015; Bunt et al., 2004; Jason
et al., 2010). Liu et al. (2016) for instance operationalised Personalized Privacy
Assistant (PPA) and found improvement in the acceptability and usability of
more suitable permissions recommended for mobile applications users. The
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concept of a Personalised Adaptive Cybersecurity (PAC) here implies security
and/or privacy functions for online applications would have to adapt not just
to contextual changes but individual user preferences or needs as well. Thus
individual differences can influence not just the perceived usability, but also
the perceived risk, attitudes and acceptability of how a specified cybersecurity
mechanism is designed (Dillon, 2001; Holden and Rada, 2011). There is the
need to further understand the factors that affect users’ perceived benefits of
security control as well as the dimensions that wholly describe their attitude
towards cybersecurity to better support the provision of PAC.
Acquiring knowledge about users and their perceptions is therefore a criti-
cal step in the process of improving the usability of cybersecurity mechanisms.
Previous studies have identified useful insights into users’ security behaviour
by focusing on one or two influential factors from existing cognitive theories
such as the Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) (Lu et al., 2005), Theory of
Planned Behaviour (TPB) (Ng and Rahim, 2005), Diffusion of Innovation the-
ory (Conklin, 2006) and the Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) (LaRose
et al., 2005; Milne et al., 2009). Our research model explores a wider variety
of these dimensions by integrating TAM with PMT to explain and predict
individuals’ security behaviours. The model is further augmented by introduc-
ing attitude to personal data as part of the key determinants of intention to
practice cybersecurity. As part of understanding users’ attitude towards cyber-
security, this research focused on the inherent vulnerabilities of web browsers
and how users interact with their built-in cybersecurity features (e.g. malware
prevention, content filtering, private browsing, password manager, etc.) for
security online.
The study combines and applies behavioural science and machine learning
(ML) techniques to better support user modelling in personalized adaptive
cybersecurity applications. An integrated model of cybersecurity adoption is
developed and tested to determine influential factors which will impact on peo-
ple’s attitude to web browser security. Partial Least Squares Structural Equa-
tion Modelling (PLS-SEM) is applied to analyse empirical data collected using
an online questionnaire-based survey. The empirical data and findings from the
PLS-SEM model then serve as input for building the Bayesian-Network (BN)
models for personalized adaptive cybersecurity (PAC). Thus the empirical ex-
perimentation with PLS-SEM assisted in determining which variables should
be considered to support the personalization capability of the BN. The result-
ing components and structure of the Bayesian-network-based model illustrate
how cybersecurity assistance can be intelligently provided.
2 ISSUES RELATED TO THE ADOPTION OF
CYBERSECURITY CONTROLS
The cyberspace as an interconnection of web technology makes the sharing
of digital information, products and services available to a broader range of
participants. Cybersecurity is concerned with the protection of devices, appli-
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cations, and data that connects to these web technologies through the internet
from unauthorised access and usage. As more and more things are being at-
tached to networks and connected to the internet (the era of Internet of Things
(IoT)), it is becoming quite impossible to separate security on stand-alone
computers from cybersecurity. Canongia and Mandarino Jr (2013) defined cy-
bersecurity as:
“The art of ensuring the existence and continuity of the information society of
a nation, guaranteeing and protecting, in Cyberspace, its information, assets
and critical infrastructure.”
This definition broadly views cybersecurity from a national perspective with
no reference to personal safety or privacy within cyberspace. Cavelty (2014)
made a distinction between national security and human security. He indi-
cated that the former entails actions that affect social functions relying on
IT and other critical infrastructures while the latter involves actions affecting
acquired values like anonymity, privacy and other personal freedoms. Craigen
et al. (2014) draw attention to the fact that, most definitions on cybersecurity
miss the interdisciplinary nature of the field and tends to focus on the tech-
nical perspective. They posited the following definition after reviewing the
literature and engaging with a multidisciplinary group of cybersecurity prac-
titioners from varying backgrounds:
“Cybersecurity is the organization and collection of resources, processes, and
structures used to protect cyberspace and cyberspace-enabled systems from oc-
currences that misalign de jure from de facto property rights.”
Accordingly, their proposed definition is aimed at capturing the multi-dimensions
of cybersecurity to promote more interdisciplinary approach in addressing
emerging complex security challenges in cyberspace. Most often than not, cy-
bersecurity strategies tend to be targeted at protecting national and/or organ-
isational security. Adopting a top-down approach by focusing on the higher
level especially the nation and big corporations have only led to individuals’
security needs being undermined. There is, therefore, the need to systemati-
cally balance national and individual security. This research seeks to provide
a holistic understanding of the effect of individuals’ cybersecurity perceptions,
attitudes and/or behaviours. This holistic view of human online security is
not just relevant in determining appropriate policies but also in improving the
usability of cybersecurity controls and increasing their acceptability among
non-expert users.
Ross and Johnson (2010) classify security controls into three categories of
management, operational and technical countermeasures that are applied to
protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA) of systems and the
information they handle. Operational and managerial controls focus on secu-
rity risks and incidents that are monitored and managed by people (e.g.usage
policies, business continuity planning, training, etc.). Technical controls are
mechanisms that use technology-based set-ups such as such as firewalls, anti-
viruses, user authentication, encryption technologies, Intrusion Detection Sys-
tems (IDS), etc. as system protection measures. As more and more people are
able to gather, process, transfer or store sensitive commercial and personal
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data over the internet, cybersecurity threats are also rapidly evolving. Achiev-
ing the aforementioned security goals of CIA are therefore as vital to the data
protection needs of domestic internet users as to corporate and government
networks. People generally want to be assured that, nobody will tamper with
their information without their consent. People also want their data to be
readily available and accessible at any point in time. Unfortunately, any form
of data, be it corporate or personal, that is exposed to the internet are at risk
of being compromised. Internet users, therefore, need to be able to easily adopt
and correctly use available cybersecurity mechanisms in minimising such risks.
However, most non-security expert users find it quite challenging to under-
stand and correctly configure available security mechanisms to avoid system
breaches and cyber-attacks. Usability of security mechanisms have longed been
identified by computer security researchers as critical to ensuring the protec-
tion of information systems (Whitten and Tygar, 1999; Zurko and Simon,
1996). This is because humans are a key component of any security system
yet they are largely considered to be the weakest link of security. Mitnick and
Simon (2011) pointed out that no matter how technically robust a security
technology is, an attacker can breakthrough by exploiting the human element.
A cybersecurity mechanism thus can lose its value if users are unwilling to
adopt it or cannot use it due to poor usability hence impact negatively on the
usability of internet based applications (Cambazoglu and Thota, 2013).
There has been little success with incorporating usability guidelines and
standards into security-related interfaces. Security-related interfaces in the
context of this research refer to the programs that allow users to manipu-
late security mechanisms on a system as well as control the effects of the
users’ manipulation and how security status is indicated. Although several
consumer software are now successfully designed to be usable, security appli-
cations still seem to be lacking in their user-friendliness. A number of usable
security studies (e.g. (Hof, 2015; Kainda et al., 2010)) have made a distinction
between usability of security software and non-security software and argued
that usable security design strategies should essentially consider and address
inherent properties that make the security domain quite challenging. Accord-
ingly, different interface design techniques are required for effective security-
related interfaces and a special case exist when adopting prevailing general
usability standards for security mechanisms.
Although usability evaluation is critical in determining the proper imple-
mentation of security tools, it cannot fully explain and predict actual adoption
and usage. Usability which is part of the overall system acceptability focuses
on the extent to which the system can be used while acceptability is concerned
with how well the system supports the needs and requirements of all stake-
holders (Nielsen, 1994; Bordo, 2010). An acceptance model is thus required to
explain and predict the acceptability of cybersecurity designs and implemen-
tation. Studies exploring acceptability in the field tend to focus on the factors
influencing the acceptance of security policies and solutions within organiza-
tional context. Topa and Karyda (2015) recently reviewed the literature on
employee security behaviour and classified the factors influencing them into
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individual, organizational and technical. Accordingly, organizations aiming to
improve security policy compliance are recommended to adopt a holistic ap-
proach that addresses issues related to all three category of factors. HCUs
may, however, not be able to access such support that may enable them to
improve their information security behaviour.
Recently, researchers have shown an increased interest in understanding
users’ security behaviour not only in the context of an organization, but also
within non-corporate settings. Coventry et al. (2014) describes several possible
scenarios affecting decision making within the context of cybersecurity differ-
ently than in other behavioural contexts. Omidosu and Ophoff (2016) high-
lighted the need for more studies into the security behaviours of non-corporate
computer users based on their systematic review of the extant literature on
information security behaviour in both organization and home contexts. Ac-
cordingly, a considerable knowledge gap exists where the security behaviour of
individual cyber citizens operating within non-corporate context is concerned.
The findings reported in this paper fills some of that gap by incorporating
empirical evidence for actual cybersecurity related attitudes and behaviours
into the development of user models for personalized adaptive cybersecurity.
It is very critical to assess and ensure the usefulness as well as user friendli-
ness of security tools developed for security inexpert users. In non-corporate
environments, technical factors influencing security behaviour includes qual-
ity, performance and usability of the technological controls. Consequently, it
is becoming increasingly important to focus on making the use of computer
security tools effortless. The user model proposed and evaluated in this study
for personalized adaptive cybersecurity is geared towards this goal of effort-
lessness.
3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR PROPOSITIONS
Factors affecting the acceptance of various computer technologies have been
a central research focus underlying the implementation of computer systems.
Davis et al. (1989) determined that resistance to computer technologies aimed
at increasing performance can be assessed and addressed with predictive be-
havioural models. This has led to the development of various models aimed
at verifying the effect of identified factors on the acceptance of different kinds
of technologies. These factors can be broadly categorised as individual, con-
textual and system characteristics. Two prominent models designed to predict
specific security behaviour are the Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) and
the Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) (Howe et al., 2012). Our research
model, as shown in Fig. 1, integrates components from both these models, and
includes other factors found to be possible determinants such as value for per-
sonalization and attitude to personal data. The model consists of three main
components (External Variables, User Perceptions/Attitudes and Cybersecu-
rity Behaviours), and explores how the identified external variables may influ-
ence perceived ease of use (PEOU), perceived usefulness (PU), perceived risk
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Fig. 1 Predictive model for user cybersecurity behavioural Intentions
(PR), value for personalization (VFP), and attitude to personal data (APD);
and how these can then predict an individual’s cybersecurity intentions (BI)
and actual cybersecurity practised and/or behaviour (ACB).
The TAM introduced by Davis et al. (1989) has since been adopted in
studying and predicting user acceptance of various forms of technology (e.g.(Lee,
2009; Mun and Hwang, 2003; Abdullah et al., 2016)). This has led to a sub-
stantial amount of theoretical and empirical support being accumulated in its
favour and is particularly regarded as being the most robust framework in ex-
plaining the adoption behaviours of information technologies (e.g. (Venkatesh
and Davis, 2000)). In our work, TAM described the relationships between the
users’ acceptance, perceptions, and external variables . As shown in Fig. 1, user
acceptance is examined by two cybersecurity behaviours — intention to use
and actual usage. TAM identifies two considerations in an individual’s deci-
sion to adopt an information system: Perceived Usefulness (PU) and Perceived
Ease of Use (PEOU). Through these, TAM provides a theoretical framework
for exploring the effect of external variables on beliefs that are internalised,
and their subsequent impact on intentions and actual behaviour. According
to TAM, PU and PEOU are the primary determinants of the intention to
use and subsequent usage behaviour. PMT on the other hand measures the
components of a fear appeal in determining the variables that impact on pro-
tection motivation in the form of behavioural intentions. Our study took TAM
as a core theoretical foundation and extends it with PMT’s cognitive media-
tion processes of threat and coping appraisal to develop a predictive model.
The model is further augmented with two additional user insights related to
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personalized digital security as primary determinants to empirically assess and
predict the user’s cybersecurity behaviour. These are Value for Personalization
(VFP) and Attitude to Personal Data (APD). The ensuing paragraphs provide
justification for the inclusion of these determinants in the research model, and
related propositions.
3.1 Proposition Set 1: User Perceptions
Beliefs that users have about the usefulness of systems and their ease of use
affect their intention to use and usage of the actual system. These perceptions
have been extensively explored in previous technology acceptance research,
and provide support for the following propositions with regards to web browser
security controls (WBSC).
3.1.1 Perceived Usefulness (PU)
– H1: PU of WBSC is positively related to cybersecurity behaviour
In the TAM, perceived usefulness refers to an individual’s intrinsic belief
about job related benefits, such as productivity, effectiveness and performance,
associated with using a new technology. In the context of this research, PU
refers to the degree to which a person believes web browser security settings
would improve their protection against cyber-attacks. This definition captures
both PU in the TAM model and response efficacy in the PMT model. Perceived
usefulness has been reported to have a positive impact on the adoption and
usage of information systems (Davis, 1989; Igbaria et al., 1997; Woon et al.,
2005). Woon et al. (2005) found response efficacy (similar to perceived use-
fulness) significantly impacted home computer users’ decision to protect their
wireless network. Jeyaraj et al. (2006) reviewed and analysed empirical studies
conducted on IT innovation adoption in the past decade and found perceived
usefulness to be the best predictor for behavioural intention. The proposition
here is that users are more likely to adopt security measures if they believe
the security mechanism provided (in this case web browser security settings)
are effective in making them cyber-secured.
3.1.2 Perceived Ease of Use (PEOU)
– H2: PEOU of WBSC is positively related to cybersecurity behaviours
– H3: PEOU of WBSC is positively related to PU
PEOU refers to an individual’s perception of the cost in terms of time
and effort (mental and physical) involved in using a system (Davis, 1989).
In previous studies, PEOU has been found to have both a direct and indi-
rect effect on behaviour through its impact on PU of the technology being
investigated. Suh and Han (2003) also discovered that both security concerns
and usability dimensions have significant direct and interaction effects on the
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adoption of smartphones for internet banking. Thus PEOU can influence users’
attitudes towards a system application as well as their perception about the
application’s usefulness during use, therefore impacting on behaviour both ex-
plicitly and implicitly (Alharbi and Drew, 2014; Davis, 1989; Venkatesh and
Davis, 2000). In the context of digital security, Ellis (2009, p. 41) noted that
“if security systems are burdensome, people may avoid using them, preferring
convenience and functionality to security”. There is also empirical support for
response cost (similar to PEOU) having a significant negative impact on in-
tention to enable security settings on a wireless network (Woon et al., 2005).
It is therefore posited that WBSC that are difficult to use and require a lot of
effort to configure will most likely be ignored and/or undervalued by users.
3.1.3 Perceived Risk (PR)
– H4: PR about WBSC is negatively related to cybersecurity behaviour
Threat appraisal is a key aspect of the PMT, and refers to the beliefs that indi-
viduals form about perceived risk when they become aware of security threats.
Their perceived risk is then evaluated against the effectiveness of the coping
mechanisms that are made available. PMT includes rewards, severity and vul-
nerability to explain how threats are perceived. In our model, we consider
rewards to be like PU and PR as the degree to which a user feels the uncer-
tainties and negative effects of configuring some web browser security settings
in areas of functional, time, information, physical and social risks (Lu et al.,
2005). Perceived risk is considered to be a multi-dimensional construct in the
literature consisting of different types of risk (e.g. physical, functional, social,
etc.) (Jacoby and Kaplan, 1972; Kaplan et al., 1974; Lu et al., 2005). This
study examined only five types of risk that are considered to be most relevant
in the context of security technology adoption. Functional or performance risk
describes the potential ineffectiveness of a security mechanism, hence failure
to achieve the desired security goals. Time risk refers to the perceived time
lost that may occur due to difficulty in configuring some security settings cor-
rectly. Information risk is the likelihood that instructions regarding the correct
use of the security mechanism is inadequate/unreliable (risk associated with
information failure). Physical risk means the extent to which an individual
believes adopting the security technology can protect them against some form
of loss, such as data, privacy or any component of the computer system (e.g.
hard disk). Social risk describes the possibility that an individual may be wor-
ried about losing their reputation in a social group due to the adoption of a
security control or technology.
Perceived risk has received considerable attention as a key predictor of
consumer behaviour within the marketing literature (e.g.(Dai et al., 2014;
Forsythe et al., 2006; Forsythe and Shi, 2003)). The construct has also been
integrated into various predictive models and has been found to have signif-
icant impact on technology adoption behaviour (e.g. (Be´langer and Carter,
2008; Featherman and Pavlou, 2003; Lee, 2009; O¨zkan et al., 2010)). However,
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far too little attention has been paid to it as a possible predictor of cyberse-
curity behaviour. Lu et al. (2005) is one of the few studies that examined and
found that perceived risk impacted on intention to adopt an Online Anti-Virus
through PU and Attitude towards use. More recently, Chang (2010) proposed
an extended TAM model that includes risk-related factors for the prediction
of managerial attitude towards the adoption of security technologies within an
organisation. Based on findings of significant effects of PR in previous tech-
nology adoption studies, we propose that computer users perceiving high risk
associated with WBSC will have a negative attitude towards cybersecurity in
general.
3.1.4 Value for Personalization (VFP)
– H5: High VFP will positively affect intention to adopt personalized adaptive
cybersecurity
Personalization is the adaptation of services or products to the needs and/or
preferences of a user. Whereas adaptive systems can be built to suit a catego-
rized group of users, personalization takes it further to a more individual level.
A number of online vendors now provide personalized products and services
through online profiles of their consumers (e.g. eBay, Dell, Amazon etc.). Dif-
ferent ML techniques are adopted in constructing these consumer profiles to
facilitate the provision of personalized products and services (Izquierdo-Yusta
et al., 2015; Kim et al., 2001; Raghu et al., 2001). In marketing/e-commerce,
personalization has been recognized as a significant influential factor in various
consumer behavioural models (e.g.(Kim et al., 2001; Xu, 2006)). User-specific
profiles allow online vendors to relate to their customers on individual basis,
leading to improved customer satisfaction and loyalty. From the online users’
point of view, however, the overall benefit of creating an online profile is the
convenience of having different parts of their browsing experience personal-
ized. Personalization can contribute to the effectiveness of technical security
controls through improvement of user interactions and experience with the
system. The nature of personalization may however differ for different types
of user experience based on the context within which user profiles are defined
and techniques used to create them. VFP in this study refers to the level of
appreciation that a user has for all types of personalization possibilities within
cyberspace. Because we recognise personalization as an important determinant
of user experience and usage, assessing its significance within the structural
model of a comprehensive set of other possible determinants of cybersecurity
behaviours is imperative. The assumption here is that users who generally
have positive attitudes towards the different types of personalized products
and services available online are more likely to accept and use personalized
adaptive cybersecurity.
3.1.5 Attitude to Personal Data (APD)
– H6: APD is positively related to cybersecurity behaviours.
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The construct of personal data (PD) and how it is perceived by individuals are
identified in our research as critical components in explaining and predicting
individuals’ attitudes towards cybersecurity. Security in the digital world is
often argued to be concerned with three main goals: confidentiality, integrity
and availability. The confidentiality aspect of security is a basic privacy goal,
and is concerned with the prevention of unauthorised access to sensitive data
(Schneier, 2011). Because personal data is a common factor underlying the
constructs of both security and privacy (Pearson, 2013), we have theorised
that personal data, and how it is perceived by individuals, influences security
related behaviour (Addae et al., 2016). APD here refers to the value people
place on their data, and their tendency to adopt measures to protect it. It
appears that many people now recognize and accept that an increasing part
of life in the digital age involves disclosure of personal data. This does not,
however, void the concerns that people may have about the actual use of
the provided data (EU, 2011). Haddadi et al. (2015) highlighted the complex
nature of personal data as a construct and how users’ preferences and concerns
differ based on context and sociological factors. To aid the inclusion of APD in
cybersecurity behavioural research models such as ours, we conducted a study
that explored APD dimensions towards the development of a personal data
attitudes measurement scale (Addae et al., 2017). Based on findings from this
study, we hypothesise that users who are generally protective towards their
personal data are more likely to adopt cybersecurity measures.
3.2 Proposition Set 2: Moderating effects of external factors
Moderators are variables that modify the direction or strength of relationships
between independent and dependent variables in a predictive model. Moder-
ating variables alter relationships through interaction with either endogenous
or exogenous variables, or by reallocating the error terms. Moderating fac-
tors have been shown to be very significant in various technology acceptance
models as they can potentially improve the predictive validity of a model un-
der investigation (Chin et al., 2003; Venkatesh et al., 2003). Moderators may
also account for inconsistent factor findings in various user technology accep-
tance models (Sun and Zhang, 2006). Sun and Zhang (2006) examined the
moderating effects in technology acceptance models and concluded that the
exclusion of important moderators reflecting individual and contextual dif-
ferences may account for lower explanatory power (predictive validity) and
factor inconsistencies in previous findings. Accordingly, models that are ex-
tended with moderators such as gender, experience and cultural background,
are more able to capture the intricacy of complex contexts. Prior empirical
studies have identified several moderating factors involving differences in in-
dividual, organisational, cultural, context and system characteristics. In this
study external variables reflecting both individual contextual differences and
system characteristics are examined.
12 Joyce H. Addae et al.
3.2.1 Individual Differences
The acceptance and adoption of cybersecurity technologies may vary from
one individual to another depending on differences in their characteristics.
Individuals differ in terms of personality, level of experience, cognitive charac-
teristics, background, and other demographics. Various aspects of individual
differences have been examined in previous research (see below). Most studies
have only considered a limited number of the variables pertaining to individ-
ual differences. A need for a holistic approach to cybersecurity user modelling
that examines the relations between various aspects of individual differences
and cybersecurity related factors thus remains. This study explores a wider
variety of these individual characteristics and examines their impact on the
perceived risk, usefulness, ease of use and attitude to personal data within the
context of cybersecurity. As observed already, TAM is based on the fundamen-
tal principle that user perceptions mediate the influence of all other external
factors that may influence technology acceptance and usage. The taxonomy of
individual difference variables from previous research (e.g.(Alavi and Joachim-
sthaler, 1992; Bostrom et al., 1990)) was considered in identifying individual
variables of interest that can be reliably measured alongside the cybersecurity
behavioural variables in our predictive model. Consequently, individual differ-
ence variables in the model do not only cover the categories of demographics
(age, gender, and environment) but also examine the descriptive characteris-
tics of domain knowledge (DK), self-efficacy (SE) and users’ security breach
concern levels (SBCL) as external variables impacting on behavioural inten-
tions towards cybersecurity.
Demographic Variables: Age has been found to moderate various fac-
tors in technology adoption and usage in the workplace (Morris and Venkatesh,
2000). In the area of cybersecurity, netizens between the ages of 18 and 25 were
found to be more susceptible to phishing than other age groups (Kumaraguru
et al., 2009; Sheng et al., 2010). The existence of gender differences in percep-
tion attributes has also been confirmed with a variety of IS diffusion models
including TAM (Venkatesh and Morris, 2000). Shin (2009) also examined and
found significant moderating effects of demographics variables, including in-
come, on the interactions among attitudes and behavioural factors in their
Unified theory of acceptance and use of technology (UTAUT) model for mo-
bile payment. More recently, Anwar et al. (2017) observed gender differences
in perceived computer security aptitudes and found that among employees
from different organizations, men scored higher on self-reported cybersecurity
behaviour than women. The usefulness and usability of a computer technology
has also be found to be dependent on several contextual factors including the
technical, organisational and physical environment within which it is adopted
and used (Parsons et al., 2010; Maguire, 2001). (Gratian et al., 2018) for in-
stance examined the influence of personality traits on cybersecurity behaviour
intentions highlighting the mediating effects of environmental factors on in-
dividual differences in making security decisions. Consequently, we included
three main demographic moderators (age, gender, and environment) in the
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study analysis to examine the moderating effects of internet users’ demograph-
ics on cybersecurity behaviour. The environment in our model refers to the
physical location where participants in the study most often use their laptop/
desktop computers to access the internet.
– H7: User demographic of age, gender and environment will moderate the
relationship amongst the constructs of the proposed predictive model for
cybersecurity behavioural intentions.
Descriptive Characteristics: Security Breach Concern Level (SBCL)
and Self-Efficacy (SE) are PMT constructs adapted to examine the mediat-
ing effects of a participant’s protection motivation on cybersecurity behaviour.
In PMT, a person’s protection motivation is derived from two cognitive ap-
praisal processes — threat appraisal and coping mechanisms. Apart from PR,
fear arousal (the level of concern invoked by the threat) also captures threat
appraisal within PMT models. Threat susceptibility has been found to predict
security intentions in a number of PMT based models used to study safety
behaviours (Tsai et al., 2016). An individual’s assessment of the probability
and consequences of a security threat is externalized as a security concern in
this study. SBCL therefore refers to the degree of security threat an individual
feels exists towards their personal safety online. The more convinced a user
is about cybersecurity threats posing a significant damage to their personal
digital assets, the more concerned they will be, resulting in a more positive
attitude towards protection mechanisms. Hence we can assume that:
– H8: High SBCL will positively influence attitude towards cybersecurity.
Several studies have examined self-efficacy by integrating it with TAM
(e.g.((Amin, 2007; Hasan, 2006; Hong et al., 2002; Ramayah, 2006)). Chau
(2001) for instance, incorporated computer attitude and self-efficacy into the
original TAM as external variables affecting perceived usefulness and ease of
use. Related research into security behaviours finds support for the prediction
that high self-efficacy positively influences attitude towards security counter-
measures (Herath and Rao, 2009; LaRose et al., 2008; Milne et al., 2009;
Woon et al., 2005). Self-efficacy has also been shown to influence adoption
and usage of IT (LaRose et al., 2008; Compeau et al., 1999). In this study,
cyber-citizens’ self-efficacy influencing and/or predicting attitude towards cy-
bersecurity behaviour is examined. The expectation is that individuals with
high self-efficacy about their ability to optimise web browser security settings
will have a more positive attitude towards cybersecurity than those with low
self-efficacy. Therefore:
– H9: High SE about WBSC will positively influence attitude towards cyber-
security.
3.2.2 System Characteristics
System Characteristics such as quality, interface design, speed/reaction time,
etc., are some of the external factors proposed to have an indirect effect on
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the acceptance and usage of information systems (IS) through user percep-
tions (Davis et al., 1989; Lin and Lu, 2000). For instance, Pituch and Lee
(2006) included system characteristics as part of the external variables influ-
encing e-learning use through perceived ease of use and usefulness. To do this,
they solicited user ratings on three different aspects of e-learning systems —
functionality, interactivity and response time. System characteristics especially
functionality and interactivity were found to have the strongest total effect on
the dependent variables of their model. The role of system characteristics in
predicting technology acceptance through user perceptions has been explored
in different contexts with a variety of system-specific features. According to
Calisir et al. (2014), system characteristics such as security, reliability and
speed, as a measure of system quality, influence expectation of the user expe-
rience level, hence increasing users’ perceived ease of use. In one of the earliest
studies conducted to measure user acceptance of information technology, the
functional and interface characteristics of an electronic mail and a text editor
were found to have significant direct effect on attitude towards usage (Davis,
1993). We identified three interface characteristics (layout, terminology and
navigation) as critical for user interaction with WBSC in our study. Thus we
argue that usability features such as clear, consistent layout and easy naviga-
tion will impact on a users’ perception of WBSC, and hence the decision to
accept or reject usage.
– H10: The quality of WBSC interface design will positively influence attitude
towards cybersecurity.
4 THE EMPIRICAL STUDY
4.1 Research Design
The main research objective is to investigate influential factors which will im-
pact on people’s security behavioural intentions towards predictive analysis
of a user’s acceptance of personalized adaptive cybersecurity (PAC) for web
browsers. A quantitative data collection and analysis approach similar to those
employed by (Lee and Kozar, 2008; Lin, 2012; Venkatesh et al., 2003; Xu et al.,
2008) in predicting behavioural intention was adopted. A field survey consist-
ing of an online measurement instrument designed to collect data regarding
factors influencing cybersecurity attitude and behaviours was conducted. The
survey instrument was developed and administered using Qualtrics, an on-
line survey tool. The measures were mostly adapted from previous studies
that have explored various types of determinants of technology usage and
specific computer security practices. For instance, the original measurement
scales of TAM were adapted and modified to fit the context of WBSC usage.
All construct measures were assessed with a 5-point Likert type scale ranging
from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree”, except for the demographics and
questions related to user preferences and/or experiences. Both positively and
negatively worded items were included on the scales. Negatively worded items
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were reverse-coded during the data analysis to ensure that a higher numbered
response on the Likert scale would represent a higher positive attitude score,
and vice versa.
The measurement instrument developed for the cybersecurity behavioural
model has four main conceptual/ theoretical components consisting of Individ-
ual differences, user perceptions/ attitudes, behavioural variables and cyberse-
curity personalization components. The individual differences section consists
of four exogenous driver constructs (i.e., IC, DN, SE and SBCL) as well as
basic demographics such as age, gender, and environment. Thus the section
measures participants’ experience with web browser security (DK), self-efficacy
(SE), personal preferences in terms of browser types and their respective user
interfaces (IC) and their levels of concerns for security breach (SBCL). The
second part of the instrument assessed participants’ general attitudes towards
cybersecurity from five main user perceptions: Ease of Use, Usefulness, Risk,
Personalization and Personal Data. Hence TAM and PMT items (PU, PEOU,
and PR) together with value for personalization (VFP) and attitude to per-
sonal data (APD) items represent key determinants of the endogenous target
constructs.
To minimize respondent fatigue, the APD scale adopted from (Addae et al.,
2017) was simplified by selecting only eight items based on overall cluster mem-
bership predictor importance of the APD factors as well as the reliability score
of the measured items. Consequently, questions on Personal Data Awareness
(PDA), Personal Data Protection (PDP) and Privacy Concerns (PC) measured
reflectively, captured the major facets of the APD as a Type II second-order
construct. This was to allow us to fully assess participant’s attitude to personal
data in relation to cybersecurity intention and usage behaviour. The third sec-
tion (Behavioural variables) consists of measures for the target constructs of
interest (i.e., BI and ACB) and asked whether the respondents had ever used
or attempted to use web browser security functionalities as well as intentions
toward personalized web browser security assistance. In the final part, items
adapted from Xu et al. (2008) were used to collect participants’ ratings on the
personalization dimensions identified for the purposes of building a Bayesian-
based network model for adaptive cybersecurity. All measured items included
in the survey instruments are described with references to where they were
adapted from in Appendix A. Items are grouped into the factors represented
on the research model (Fig. 1) to ensure that a complete dataset is collected
for hypothesis testing and data analysis.
4.2 Study Overview
The protocol analysis methodology is combined with observation and the sys-
tem usability survey (SUS) in a SUT set-up to evaluate the usability of three
commonly used web browser’s security settings (GC, IE and FF). The pri-
mary goal is to identify underlying usability issues as well as merits of specific
interface attributes prefered by users allowing us to propose design recom-
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mendations for future web browser security interface and user interactions.
In reviewing existing work on usable security, it has become very clear that
several security labs and research studies have yielded valuable insights into
user’s security behaviour over the past decade. A major gap, however, is lack
of studies that reflect users’ actual security behaviour (e.g. have they opti-
mised the security settings of their own personal computer?) within specific
contexts.
To better understand users’ web browsing security behaviour, it was deemed
necessary to inspect study participants’ actual browser security settings. Gath-
ering real web browser security settings dataset on users’ personal comput-
ers/laptops could help in measuring the impact of actual security behaviours
exhibited by users on the security state of their personal computers. To this
effect, in addition to the SUT adopted for this study, physical inspection of
participants’ browser security settings was carried out to better compare users’
behavioural intentions and actual security behaviours. During the inspection,
participants were interviewed on their motivation for choosing specific secu-
rity configurations after accessing whether or not the said settings adequately
meet their security/privacy goals.
4.3 Data Collection
A pilot test was first conducted with a mix of 50 university students and lec-
turers to ensure the survey instrument is comprehensible and valid. Feedback
from the pilot was used to revise the final version. Convenience sampling was
adopted to collect data with the questionnaire on two main university cam-
puses in China and UK via emails. The questionnaire was also distributed on-
line using various social media platforms including Facebook, Twitter, WeChat
and LinkedIn. A total of 421 participants took part in the survey however, 37
incomplete and invalid responses had to be removed resulting in 384 usable
responses. Alluding to the “ten times” rule of thumb on minimum sample size,
the 384 valid responses meets the requirement for a PLS-SEM analysis. Ac-
cordingly, the 384 sample size is more than ten times the largest number of
structural paths (six) directed at the most targeted construct in the model
(ACB) and also more than ten times the number of indicators (six) used to
measure the most complex construct in the model (APD) (Hair et al., 2011).
The raw data were imported from Qualtrics and coded into the IBM SPSS
statistic program for a descriptive analysis of respondent profiles.
4.4 Data Analysis
The settings and goals of this research favours the use of PLS-SEM based on
the criterion identified by Hair et al. (2011). Using the SmartPLS 3 software,
the Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) technique of Partial Least Squares
(PLS) was employed to assess the theoretical model (Ringle et al., 2015).
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PLS-SEM has proven to be a very valuable approach to developing and test-
ing models in behavioural research. The approach is particularly versatile for
extending models and running complementary analysis such as nonlinear re-
lationships and moderation alongside hierarchical component models allowing
for more complex model relationships to be tested. The PLS-SEM technique
also deals with data related threats such as sample size, unobserved hetero-
geneity and normality in the dataset, to the validity of standard predictive
analytics. PLS-SEM computes parameter estimates from least square estima-
tion hence minimizing the demands on required assumptions about the dataset
including the measurement scale for the data collection, sample size and resid-
ual distributions (Henseler et al., 2016). The PLS-SEM approach also allows
for formative and multi-level constructs making it favourable for exploring
possible causal relationships while avoiding parameter estimation biases typ-
ical of regression analysis. With reference to the two-step analytical process
described in Hair et al. (2011), the measurement model was first evaluated for
reliability and validity as the first step. The structural theory is then verified
to determine the significant levels of the hypothesized relationships at the sec-
ond step. The 2-step approach ensures inferences drawn from the structural
relationship are based on validated measurement scales.
5 RESULTS
5.1 Sample Characteristics
Table 1 summarizes the characteristic and demographic distribution of par-
ticipants. 51.3% of respondents were female and 48.7% males. The majority
of respondents were students (70.3%) and fall within the age group of 18-24
(62.0%). A total of 99% of the respondents were educated well above 12th
grade and 72.7% earned an income of 1,000 to 8,000 US Dollars per month
and 27.3% earned less than $1,000.
5.2 Reliability and Validity of the Measurement Model
The outer measurement model was examined for reliability and convergent
validity with the same PLS software. All variance inflation factor (VIF) val-
ues are below 5.0 which suggests multicollinearity is unlikely to be a problem
in our data analysis. Following guidelines in Hair Jr et al. (2016), VIF was
further checked to determine if the first-order factors of APD were three dis-
tinct constructs. The VIF values of all constructs were below the conventional
estimate of 5.0 with the highest being 3.195. Convergent validity for items
in this study was assessed through their factor loadings in order to support
the theory that sufficient convergent validity is achieved when the item mea-
sures the target latent construct. All the indicator items had significant path
loadings at an alpha level of 0.01 and had high loading (> 0.5) on their re-
spective parent constructs (Hair Jr et al., 2016; Urbach and Ahlemann, 2010).
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Table 1 Respondent Profile
Demographic Variables Freq.
N=384
(%) Σ %
Age
18 - 24 years 238 62.0 62.0
25 - 34 years 93 24.2 86.2
35 - 44 years 42 10.9 97.1
< 45 years 11 2.9 100.0
Education
12th grade or less 4 1.0 1.0
High school diploma 118 30.7 31.8
Some college (no degree) 61 15.9 47.7
Associate degree 9 2.3 50.0
Bachelor’s degree 86 22.4 72.4
Graduate/ postgraduate 106 27.6 100.0
Employment
Employed for wages 74 19.3 19.3
Self-employed 13 3.4 22.7
Unemployed 22 5.8 26.8
A homemaker 2 0.5 28.9
A student 270 70.3 99.2
Retired 3 0.8 100.0
Ethnicity
Asian/ Pacific Islander 29 7.6 7.6
African/ Black 52 13.5 21.1
Caucasian/ White 67 17.4 38.6
Chinese 193 50.3 88.9
Hispanic/ Latino 14 3.7 92.6
Other 29 7.5 100.0
Environment
Home 205 53.4 53.4
Corporate 111 28.9 82.3
Public 68 17.7 100.0
Gender
Male 187 48.7 48.7
Female 197 51.3 100.0
Income per month
Less than $1,000 105 27.3 27.3
$1,000 to $5,000 165 43.0 70.3
$5,000 to $8,000 66 17.2 87.5
$8,000 or more 48 12.5 100.0
All of the outer loadings in the measurement model were above the minimum
recommended level of 0.708 with the exceptions of ACB 4 (0.622) and PU 3
(0.651). We retained these two items in the measurement model because they
were very close to 0.70 and the criteria for reliability and convergent validity
were met (Hair Jr et al., 2016). For the higher order construct (HOC) APD, all
paths from the three exogenous driver constructs were meaningful (PDA=0.20,
PDP=0.68 and PC=0.21). All the values of composite reliability (CR) and av-
erage variance extracted (AVE) were well within the recommended threshold
(Hair et al., 2010; Urbach and Ahlemann, 2010), with CR ranging from 0.81
to 0.95 and AVE from 0.62 to 0.86 (Table 2). The square root values of all
the AVEs shown in bold and placed diagonally in Table 3 show that discrimi-
nant validity is well established. The distinctiveness of the contents captured
by the three individual first-order factors of APD is demonstrated by their
correlations which are well below the 0.80 boundary for establishing discrim-
inant validity. In summary, the results of the statistical analysis support the
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reliability, convergent and discriminant validity of the scales in our research
model.
Table 2: Constructs Reliability and Validity
Latent Variables Scale Items Loadings CR AVE
Behaviour
ACB 1 0.90 0.90 0.69
ACB 2 0.90
ACB 3 0.88
ACB 4 0.61
Experience
DK 1 0.87 0.90 0.82
DK 2 0.94
Intention
BI 1 0.88 0.93 0.81
BI 2 0.92
BI 3 0.91
Interface
BI 1 0.82 0.90 0.70
IC 2 0.84
IC 3 0.85
IC 4 0.82
PD Awareness
PDA 1 0.79 0.87 0.69
PDA 2 0.88
PDA 3 0.82
PD Protection
PDP 1 0.79 0.83 0.62
PDP 2 0.76
PDP 3 0.81
Privacy Concern
PRI 1 0.93 0.92 0.86
PRI 2 0.92
Perceived Risk
PR 1 0.92 0.93 0.81
PR 2 0.91
PR 3 0.88
Personalization
VFP 1 0.93 0.95 0.86
VFP 2 0.95
VFP 3 0.91
Security Concerns
SBCL 1 0.82 0.93 0.78
SBCL 2 0.90
SBCL 3 0.91
SBCL 4 0.91
Self-Efficacy
SE 1 0.71 0.85 0.65
SE 2 0.83
SE 3 0.87
Usability
PEOU 1 0.80 0.81 0.68
PEOU 2 0.85
Usefulness
PU 1 0.85 0.84 0.64
PU 2 0.87
PU 3 0.65
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Table 3 Inter-construct correlations and Fornell-Larcker Criterion Analysis
ACB DK BI IC PDA PDP PR VFP PC SBCL SE PEOU PU
ACB 0.83
DK 0.67 0.90
BI 0.29 0.05 0.90
IC 0.07 -0.13 0.67 0.84
PDA 0.59 0.52 0.21 0.13 0.83
PDP 0.78 0.73 0.13 -0.04 0.66 0.79
PC -0.14 -0.12 0.07 0.13 -0.01 -0.14 0.90
VFP 0.65 0.56 0.14 -0.05 0.68 0.62 -0.01 0.93
PC 0.68 0.82 0.05 -0.20 0.51 0.76 -0.11 0.61 0.93
SBCL 0.34 0.41 -0.06 -0.21 0.49 0.45 0.26 0.56 0.47 0.88
SE 0.53 0.55 0.02 -0.16 0.70 0.66 -0.06 0.64 0.59 0.65 0.81
PEOU 0.49 0.27 0.76 0.53 0.21 0.33 -0.08 0.14 0.24 -0.08 0.09 0.83
PU 0.54 0.47 0.12 0.00 0.86 0.64 0.01 0.66 0.52 0.62 0.78 0.13 0.80
5.3 Structural Model
Experience 
(DK)
Security 
Concerns 
(SBCL)
Individual factors user Perceptions/ Attitudes Behavioural Domain
Interface
(IC) 
Self-
Efficacy 
(SE)
Usability 
(PEOU) (R2
= 0.40)
Usefulness 
(PU) 
(R2 = 0.65)
Risk (PR) 
(R2 = 0.20)
Personalize 
(VFP)
(R2 = 0.50)
Personal 
Data (APD)
(R2 = 0.98)PD 
Protection 
(PDP) 
(R2 = 0.20)
Privacy 
Concern 
(PC)
PD 
Awareness 
(PDA) 
Intention 
(BI)
(R2 = 0.62)
Actual 
Behaviour
(ACB)
(R2 = 0.72)
0.65* (t=15.79)
0.10*(t=2.86) 0.05(t=1.12)
Fig. 2 Path Model and PLS-SEM estimates
Results of the structural model analysis are displayed in Fig 2. Paths in a
PLS structural model can be interpreted similarly to standardized regression
betas hence the overall predictive strength of the model is assessed by the ex-
plained variance in the endogenous variables. Tests of significance of all paths
were performed following the bootstrap resampling procedure outlined in Gar-
son (2012). In the model, R2 value indicates the total variance explained by
the endogenous latent variables. R2 values of 0.19, 0.33, or 0.67 for endogenous
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variables in the path model are described as weak, substantial or moderate re-
spectively. A bootstrapping resampling procedure (5000 samples) was used to
determine the significance of the path coefficients. Here, a multistage approach
is adopted to facilitate the assessment of the APD impact on the two main
endogenous variables in our extended-TAM model. The first model consisted
of only the TAM and PMT Latent Variables (LV) as mediators and explained
59% and 49% of the variances in the two target constructs BI and ACB respec-
tively. The value for personalization (VFP) factor was included in the second
stage which increased the variance explained in ACB to 64%. The effect size
(f2) was assessed with the following equation:
f2=
R2included−R2excluded
1− R2included
(1)
Where R2included and R
2
excluded are the R
2 values of the dependent LV
when specific independent LV are included or excluded from the model. Values
≥0.02, ≤0.15, and ≤0.35 for f2 respectively, represent small, medium and large
effects of the exogenous LV (Hair Jr et al., 2016). The effect size of VFP on
the endogenous construct ACB was large (0.40) and significant (p<0.001).
Subsequently, the APD LV was added to the model and this second-order
factor increased the R2 of BI from 59% to 63%, and that of ACB from 64%
to 74%. The effect size f2 is large (0.47) and significant (p<0.001) for the
predictive value of APD on ACB. There is also a small effect size (0.10) of
APD on PCAI, which is significant at (p<0.005). Fig.2 provides the R2values
for each endogenous variable in the full PLS model along with path coefficients
and associated t-values of the paths. To simplify the structural model and
make it more legible, only paths that have significant relationships (indicated
with asterisk on the path coefficient) are included in Fig 2. However, the
insignificant path from BI to ACB is included since they are the two main
output variables that mainly require further discussion.
The results (Table 4) show all five behavioural attitude determinants PEOU,
PU, PR, VFP and APD, have significant effects on the behavioural intention
to accept adaptive personalized cybersecurity. The five constructs together ex-
plain 63% of the variance in behavioural intention (BI). However only three
of them were found to predict actual previous adoption of cybersecurity tools
as the hypothesized path from BI was not statistically significant. The re-
lationship between PU and ACB was significant (β = −0.09, p < 0.05),
but not in the predicted direction. In this study, PEOU had the highest
of the five path coefficients and a significant positive relationship with BI
(β = 0.84, t = 51.5, p < 0.001) while APD appears to be the most important
variable in the model predicting ACB (β = 0.64, t = 12.87, p < 0.001). Value
for Personalization was also found to have a significant effect on BI and ACB
hence justifying its importance in influencing users behavioural intention and
attitude towards adaptive cybersecurity in a personal context.
In addition to evaluating the magnitude of the R2 values as a criterion of
predictive accuracy, the model’s out-of-sample predictive power (Q2) values
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Table 4 Summary of Findings
Hypothesized Paths Path Coefficients t-values f2 Supported?
Experience (DK) –> Perceived Risk (PR) -0.16 2.81** 0.02 Yes
Experience (DK) –> Personalization (VFP) 0.29 6.49*** 0.12** Yes
Experience (DK) –> Usability (PEOU) 0.35 7.75*** 0.20** Yes
Intention (BI) –> Actual Behaviour (ACB) -0.05 1.09 0 No
Interface (IC) –> Perceived Risk (PR) 0.17 3.37** 0.04 Yes
Interface (IC) –> Usability (PEOU) 0.58 17.38*** 0.54*** Yes
Interface (IC) –> Usefulness (PU) 0.15 4.09*** 0.06** Yes
Personal Data (APD) –> Actual Behaviour (ACB) 0.62 12.87*** 0.47*** Yes
Personal Data (APD) –> Intention (BI) -0.33 5.51*** 0.10** Yes
Perceived Risk (PR) –> Intention (BI) 0.10 2.90** 0.03 Yes
Personalization (VFP) –> Actual Behaviour (ACB) 0.26 5.38*** 0.12** Yes
Personalization (VFP) –> Intention (BI) 0.15 2.92** 0.03 Yes
Security Concerns (SBCL) –> PD-Protection (PDP) 0.45 11.97*** 0.25*** Yes
Security Concerns (SBCL) –> Perceived Risk (PR) 0.56 9.08*** 0.22*** Yes
Security Concerns (SBCL) –> Personalization (VFP) 0.22 5.00*** 0.05** Yes
Security Concerns (SBCL) –> Usefulness (PU) 0.22 4.89*** 0.08** Yes
Self-Efficacy (SE) –> Perceived Risk (PR) -0.31 5.09*** 0.06** Yes
Self-Efficacy (SE) –> Personalization (VFP) 0.34 6.95*** 0.11*** Yes
Self-Efficacy (SE) –> Usefulness (PU) 0.65 15.77*** 0.70*** Yes
Usability (PEOU) –> Actual Behaviour (ACB) 0.28 5.24*** 0.10** Yes
Usability (PEOU) –> Intention (BI) 0.84 31.50*** 1.59*** Yes
Usefulness (PU) –> Actual Behaviour (ACB) -0.09 2.38** 0.01 No
Usefulness (PU) –> Intention (BI) 0.15 2.90** 0.03 Yes
Note: *p < 0.05. **p < 0.01. ***p < .001
were also examined. Here a sample re-use technique called blindfolding that
omits part of the data matrix and uses the model estimates to predict the
omitted part is applied to obtain the Q2 values for the endogenous constructs
(Hair Jr et al., 2016; Tenenhaus et al., 2005). Q2 values greater than zero
for specific reflective endogenous LV indicate the predictive relevance of the
path model for that particular construct. Relatively values of 0.02, 0.15 and
0.35 indicate that the model respectively has a small, medium or large predic-
tive relevance for the specified endogenous construct. Table 5 shows that all
Q2 values are considerably greater than zero, thus providing support for the
cybersecurity behavioural model’s predictive relevance for all the endogenous
constructs especially having large predictive relevance (Q2 > 0.35) for both of
our two main target constructs (BI and ACB).
5.4 Moderating Effects
Further analysis was conducted to examine the moderating effects of demo-
graphic variables (Age, Gender) as well as the moderating influence of context
of use (Home vs Corporate vs Public environments) on the hypothesized re-
lationships in our model. When included in the model as control variables,
age (β = 0.17, t = 2.74, p < 0.05), gender (β = 0.08, t = 2.00, p < 0.05) and
environment (β = −0.23, t = 3.71, p < 0.001) were significantly associated
with BI but none of them were significantly associated with ACB. Context of
use (Environment) was negatively associated with BI, and it seems that users
who more often access the web in public places are less interested in person-
alized adaptive cybersecurity. Although no specific hypothesis were declared
for demographic variables of income education and ethnicity, their moderating
effects were also explored in the analysis. However, since their effects were not
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Table 5 Predictive accuracy R2 and out of sample predictive power Q2 values
Endogenous LV R2 Value Q2 Value
Behaviour (ACB) 0.74 0.48
Intention (BI) 0.63 0.48
PD Attitude (APD) 0.98 0.48
PD Protection (PDP) 0.20 0.12
Perceived Risk (PR) 0.20 0.15
Personalization (VFP) 0.50 0.40
Usability (PEOU) 0.40 0.26
Usefulness (PU) 0.65 0.39
statistically significant, they were not included in the results presented here for
further analysis. PLS-SEM multi-group analysis (PLS-MGA) was conducted
to determine whether significant differences are present between coefficients for
the observed heterogeneity (age, gender and environment). PLS-MGA is used
for comparing PLS model estimates across groups of data when the groups
pre-exist (Hair Jr et al., 2016; Sarstedt et al., 2011).
To explore the moderating influence of gender, the data was split into Male
(n=184) and Female (n=200) subgroups and separate analyses were computed
for each group with the full model. Three subgroups were created for age 18-34
(n=169), 35-44 (n=139) and <44 (n=76), as well as for environment and/or
context of use Corporate (n=111), Home (n=205) and Public (n=68). As the
maximum number of arrows pointing to an endogenous variable in our model
is five, a minimum of 5*10=50 observations per group is required according
to the 10-times rule. The group-specific sample sizes for the three moderating
variables can therefore be considered to be sufficient for the PLS-MGA. Since
more than two groups are being compared in the case of age and environment,
the Omnibus test of group differences (OTG) approach was applied as a first
step to assess whether the path coefficients are equal across the three age and
three environment groups.
The analysis (Table 6) yields FR values ranging from 493.35 to 23289.54
for paths between the mediating variables and the two target variables for the
environment groups. FR values ranging from 686.06 to 10143.30 were yielded
for the age group differences on direct paths to our target variables. The null
hypothesis that the path coefficients across the three groups of age and that
of the environment are the same can, therefore, be rejected. Thus the test
rendered all differences among the groups significant at p ≤ 0.01 suggesting
at least one path coefficient differs from the remaining two across the three
groups both in the case of age and environment.
Table 7 shows the differences in the path coefficient estimates of the group
comparisons with respect to all the direct paths to the two DVs in the model,
and provides the results of multigroup comparisons based on PLS-MGA and
Welch-Satterthwait (W-S) Test. While the PLS-MGA is a non-parametric test
for difference of group-specific results based on PLS-SEM bootstrapping re-
sults, the W-S is a parametric test that assumes unequal variances across
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Table 6 Results of OTG for Age and Environment
Relationship Group B SS-Between SS-Within FR p
Intention -> Behaviour Environment 3 5000 206.64 0.10 2078.45 0.00
PD Attitude -> Behaviour Environment 3 5000 614.86 0.17 3632.59 0.00
PD Attitude -> Intention Environment 3 5000 544.58 0.06 8713.34 0.00
Perceived Risk -> Intention Environment 3 5000 13.94 0.01 1277.02 0.00
Personalization -> Behaviour Environment 3 5000 92.18 0.19 493.35 0.00
Personalization -> Intention Environment 3 5000 11.93 0.02 669.01 0.00
Usability -> Behaviour Environment 3 5000 253.81 0.12 2204.58 0.00
Usability -> Intention Environment 3 5000 287.35 0.01 23289.54 0.00
Usefulness -> Behaviour Environment 3 5000 419.16 0.05 8141.08 0.00
Usefulness -> Intention Environment 3 5000 488.88 0.03 16709.36 0.00
Intention -> Behaviour Age Group 3 5000 99.51 0.03 3627.87 0.00
PD Attitude -> Behaviour Age Group 3 5000 20.39 0.02 1209.78 0.00
PD Attitude -> Intention Age Group 3 5000 32.16 0.05 686.06 0.00
Perceived Risk -> Intention Age Group 3 5000 28.84 0.02 1568.55 0.00
Personalization -> Behaviour Age Group 3 5000 149.00 0.02 7804.65 0.00
Personalization -> Intention Age Group 3 5000 87.93 0.03 2860.52 0.00
Usability -> Behaviour Age Group 3 5000 59.70 0.04 1662.00 0.00
Usability -> Intention Age Group 3 5000 500.49 0.05 9669.07 0.00
Usefulness -> Behaviour Age Group 3 5000 32.01 0.01 3194.20 0.00
Usefulness -> Intention Age Group 3 5000 265.61 0.03 10143.30 0.00
groups to determine the significance difference of group-specific PLS-SEM. As
a one-tailed test, a typical cut-off level of significance for PLS-MGA results is
>0.95 or <0.05, but the cut-off level can be set to >0.90 or <0.10 for smaller
sample sizes. Slight differences between the PLS-MGA and W-S with respect
to the significance of some of the group differences for specific relationships
were observed. For instance, in the comparison of the Home and Public sub-
samples, the test rendered the relationship between Usefulness and Behaviour
significant (p ≤ 0.10) for PLS-MGA whereas this was insignificant in the W-S
test (p = 0.15).
Table 8 summarizes the PLS-MGA results into a matrix to give a more
simplified visual interpretation on determining significant effects based on de-
mographics/ moderators. The findings support the assumption that the effects
of the attitudinal variables on the two target constructs may be dependent on
moderating variables. The results revealed significant differences in the group
specific PLS path coefficients for the influences of the five mediating variables
on ACB as well as BI on ACB. With regard to the age groups, there were signif-
icant differences between the groups for the relationship from BI to ACB, VFP
to ACB, PEOU to BI, and PU to BI. In terms of Gender, the relationship be-
tween BI and ACB was negative and significant (β = −0.25, t = 3.04, p < 0.05)
for males while non-significant for the females. This suggest that the unex-
pected negative relationship between BI and ACB that was found in the full
sample results (Fig. 2) seems to be largely based on the male respondents. Two
other significant differences between males and females subgroups are the re-
lationships from PEOU to BI and from PU to BI. Although the relationship
between PEOU and BI is positive and highly significant (p < 0.001) for both
groups, the MGA results shows that usability is somewhat more important
in determining BI among females than males. Meanwhile, the relationship be-
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Table 7 Multigroup Comparison Test Results
Paths/Relationships Comparison PLS-MGA
Welch-Satterthwait Test
Path Coefficients
- diff
p-Value t-Value p-Value
Intention -> Behaviour Male vs Female 0.27 0.98 2.07 0.04
Usability -> Intention Male vs Female 0.22 1.00 3.15 0.00
Usefulness -> Intention Male vs Female 0.21 0.04 1.90 0.06
PD Attitude -> Intention Home vs Corporate 0.44 0.94 2.15 0.03
Usability -> Intention Home vs Corporate 0.15 0.02 2.02 0.05
Usefulness -> Intention Home vs Corporate 0.20 0.05 1.75 0.08
Usefulness -> Behaviour Corporate vs Public 0.38 0.04 1.75 0.08
Usefulness -> Intention Corporate vs Public 0.43 0.99 2.59 0.01
Usability -> Intention Home vs Public 0.27 0.00 3.12 0.00
Usefulness -> Behaviour Home vs Public 0.26 0.07 1.47 0.15
Usefulness -> Intention Home vs Public 0.22 0.95 1.59 0.12
Personalization -> Behaviour Age <44 vs Age >34 0.21 0.97 1.88 0.06
Usability -> Intention Age <44 vs Age >34 0.28 0.97 1.25 0.21
Usefulness -> Intention Age <44 vs Age >34 0.23 0.04 1.71 0.09
Personalization -> Behaviour Age 35-44 vs Age >34 0.15 0.92 1.43 0.16
Personalization -> Intention Age 35-44 vs Age >34 0.13 0.91 1.30 0.19
Usefulness -> Intention Age 35-44 vs Age >34 0.21 0.02 2.08 0.04
Intention -> Behaviour Age 35-44 vs Age <45 0.19 0.07 1.44 0.15
Usability -> Intention Age 35-44 vs Age <48 0.25 0.10 0.97 0.33
Note: significance levels <0.10 are highlighted in green and blue highlights indicates
significance levels determined at >0.90.
tween PU and BI was positive and significant (β = 0.22, t = 2.16, p < 0.05)
for males while insignificant for females.
For the Environment subgroups, there were significant differences for re-
lationships from APD to BI, PEOU to BI, PU to ACB and PU to BI. Inter-
estingly, the path from PU to ACB was negative and moderately significant
(β = −0.31, t = 1.83, p < 0.10) for the public user group but insignificant for
the corporate environment group. Thus usefulness in not important in pre-
dicting cybersecurity usage behaviour for those who mostly assess the internet
within a corporate environment while most home and especially public users
do not adopt cybersecurity tools though they may think they are useful. The
differences in the environment groups for the relationship from PU to BI is
also worth noting. Here PU seems to be more important in predicting pos-
itive BI of the public (β = .25, t=1.92, p<0.10) and home (β = 0.470.03,
t=1.63, p>0.10) user groups than for the corporate group (β = -.0.17, t=1.73,
p<0.10). We speculate that, due to the availability of professional IT services
in corporate environments, these user group feel more secured when assessing
the internet, and hence may not see the need for an easier to use cybersecurity
mechanism. Whereas, those who mostly assess the internet from non-corporate
environments may have no access to cybersecurity experts, and may thus per-
ceive personalized adaptive cybersecurity as an easier way of ensuring their
security and privacy online. It should also be noted that the influence of at-
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Table 8 Multigroup Analysis Matrix
Paths/ Relationships Age Gender Environment
Intention -> Behavior Male** vs Female
PD Attitude -> Intention Home vs Corporate*
Personalization -> Behavior
<44 vs >34**
35-44 vs >34*
Usability -> Intention
<44 vs >34**
35-44* vs <44
Male vs Female***
Home** vs Corporate
Home*** vs Public
Usefullness -> Behavior
Corporate** vs Public
Home vs Public*
Usefullness -> Intention 35-44** vs >34 Male** vs Female
Home*** vs Corporate
Corporate vs Public**
Notes: Significant levels are associated with the subgroups with the highest PLS path
coefficients where *p < 0.10., **p < 0.05., ***p < 0.001
titude to personal data was relatively consistent across the different groups,
except in the case of the home subgroup where APD did not seem to be in-
fluential in determining their BI, although it is important in predicting their
actual cybersecurity usage (β = 0.47 t=7.57, p<0.001). Thus attitude towards
personal data appears to have a strong influence on cybersecurity behaviour
and intentions across different user age and gender groups, and for both cor-
porate and non-corporate users.
6 FRAMEWORK FOR PERSONALIZED ADAPTIVE
CYBERSECURITY
Technology users differ in various ways in terms of goals, attitudes, and a host
of individual characteristics and preferences that tends to influence their user
experience. Design of user interaction for security and privacy technologies
needs to accommodate different user goals and preferences. In the context of
personal computing, web browsers provide a good platform to demonstrate
the provision of adaptive and personalised cybersecurity configurations. Most
current versions of web browsers allow users to sign in and synchronise their
custom configurations across devices. This provides an opportunity to per-
sonalise default browser security settings as well as the presentation of alerts
to improve their acceptance rate and reduce cognitive loads associated with
digital security on a personal level. User model development is fundamental
in an adaptive architecture for personalising user preferences. A user model
consists of essential information and assumptions about users that can then
be used to adapt the interaction of an application to specific individual users’
needs. Building user models for adaptation and personalization often consists
of two different approaches: one for the general user model and one for the
personalised model. The general user model requires research and user ex-
perimentation to identify domain based generalization and classification of
user interaction behaviours into specific user profiles. The personal model on
the other hand will adapt new interactions based on observed data from an
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individual user session. An individualised profile for adaptive cybersecurity,
for instance, will include background information on an identified user, goals,
preferences as well as information on the target device and web application.
Thus, the amalgamation of the user and personal model enables adaptation
to be personalized through the classification of users based on demographic
information and several other contextual and individual characteristics.
Research has shown that the cybersecurity field requires a multidisciplinary
approach to identifying and translating the salient factors influencing spe-
cific privacy and security decisions into more effective user models. While
findings from PLS-SEM are useful to determine these salient factors and
their dependencies, a lot of uncertainty remains in the attempt to recognize
a user’s goals from observations of behaviour. A powerful modelling tech-
nique developed by the artificial intelligence and ML community for effec-
tive reasoning in conditions of uncertainty in a sound mathematical manner
is Bayesian Networks (BNs) (Nadkarni and Shenoy, 2004). BNs, also known
as Belief Networks, provide a consistent way of replicating the essential fea-
tures of plausible reasoning and have been successfully applied in the fields
of medicine (e.g.(Sakellaropoulos and Nikiforidis, 2000)), marketing (Ahn and
Ezawa, 1997) and business management. BNs are known to be particularly use-
ful in handling uncertainties in user modelling for different kinds of application
domains. They are typically used in situations where variables characterise the
existence or absence of a quantifiable outcome.
In our study, BNs serve as an important tool to complement the user
modelling process for adaptive cybersecurity. This is because the relation-
ships between the many factors influencing a user’s digital security decisions
are mostly unclear. The empirical study conducted has allowed us to identify
these influential factors and determine the directionality of their interactions.
This makes directed edges in BNs more appropriate for our model than undi-
rected edges in Markov Random Fields (Koller et al., 2007). In the context
of cybersecurity where access control policies and privacy breach regulation
are major concerns, accessing real-life behavioural data for research is always
a challenge. Complementing the PLS-SEM used to derive additional domain
knowledge with a Bayesian-based modelling technique is therefore an efficient
way to deal with sparse and/or incomplete data. BNs allow us to intuitively
infer the hidden states of the influential factors from the PLS-SEM through ob-
servation of their interrelating effects. With Bayes’ rule, the inference problem
can then be formulated as a case of resolving the probability of an unknown
variable from values of variables observed in the empirical study. Apart from
being able to describe uncertainty with BNs, there is the added advantage of
being able to integrate different types of variables and related data within a
single framework, and the flexibility of updating the models with new infor-
mation at any given time.
The components of the framework (Fig. 4) were extracted from the empiri-
cal study described in section 4. Following the validation of the behavioural re-
search model, the statistical analysis of data on the personalization dimensions
proposed in Fig. 3 is used to support the construction of the Bayesian network
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Fig. 3 Proposed dimensions of personal adaptive cybersecurity assistance (PACA)
model in our study. Nielsen and Jensen (2009) described Bayesian networks as
a directed acyclic graph (DAG) consisting of a set of variables and a set of di-
rected edges between variables. The structure is mathematically referred to as
a DAG whereby variables represents events and a link from event A to B rep-
resents a causal relation whereby A is a parent of B and B is a child of A. Each
variable B with parents A1, . . . An has the potential table P(B|A1, . . . An)
which holds conditional probability distributions. Consequently, the proposed
Bayesian networks will yield both quantitative measures in the form of condi-
tional probability distributions as well as qualitative relationships between the
components of personalized cybersecurity. The network of relationships in the
BNs highlight how the various components interact with each other to influ-
ence the decision making process. Analysing the personalization components
of cybersecurity with a Bayesian network can help in the characterization of
various interactions between user context, profile, preferences and cybersecu-
rity behaviour. To summarize, a user profile constituting personal information
and observed behaviour, system characteristic variables (e.g. browser type, se-
curity settings etc.), and context of use are the factors being considered for
personalized or adaptive cybersecurity within web browsers.
6.1 Structuring the Bayesian-Network-Based Model
Given the results from the empirical studies, we decided to build and assess
Bayesian models that can determine a user’s security/privacy needs and likeli-
hood to adopt available cybersecurity solutions. Defining appropriate variables
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Fig. 4 Bayesian Network framework to infer and provide personalized adaptive cybersecu-
rity assistance
and states of the identified variables are the building blocks of an effective user
model. We wanted to achieve quality inferences from the models by incorpo-
rating contextual information, user’s actions including queries (both current
and previous), as well as the user’s background and personal preferences. It is
important to define the states of the variables included in the model clearly
so users can be monitored and the conditional probabilities assessed. To es-
tablish a database for the BN model, the impacts of attributes related to web
browser security features are analysed together with individual characteristics
and context of use factors. Information from the survey instrument is used to
produce a table values for the personalization component variables and used
to calculate the prior probabilities of the model. To simplify the analysis, the
levels within most of the variables were reduced. For instance the variable
“location” was reclassified into three categories: home, public and corporate
instead of the seven different locations measured with our survey scale (Home,
School, Office, Public Transport, Cafes, Lecture rooms and Friend’s house).
Time of use was also set to peak and non-peak where peak time denotes peri-
ods where the user may normally be involved with official use of the internet
for work or business related goals, and non-peak for pleasure or non-business
related goals. Using a BN for analysis of responses to the cybersecurity per-
sonalization survey data can uncover and characterize the interaction of the
personalization components and user’s cybersecurity behaviour. Consequently,
the output of a BN will reveal both the qualitative relationships between the
attributes of personalized adaptive cybersecurity as well as the quantitative
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measures in the form of conditional probability distributions of the factors’
dependencies and interactions.
BNs can be modelled based on priori domain knowledge and/or training
datasets (Heckerman et al., 1995). Since it is not easy to acquire cyberse-
curity related datasets on HCUs, we complemented the available dataset we
gathered from the survey with domain knowledge to obtain the best combi-
nation of nodes for the BNs. Simulated datasets may not guarantee findings
that fully reflect real-world data problems but they are widely adopted to
garner deep insights and train machine learning models for various applica-
tion domains (e.g. (Judson et al., 2008; Tsanas and Xifara, 2012)). Simulating
aspects of network systems for instance has allowed researchers to overcome
challenges of using data mining and ML for cyber analytics and to incorporate
their intuition into building training models for intrusion detection (Buczak
and Guven, 2016). In this context, the cybersecurity personalization factors
extracted from the data analysis along with knowledge about web browser
security features are used to develop the initial BN models for security-related
tasks and subtasks. A complete model can then be obtained by combining
several partial models developed from domain knowledge and simulated data
focusing on representative nodes. For instance, if we know a relation exists
between a user’s security/privacy perceptions and expertise, these nodes can
be connected by amending their conditional probability table (CPT) bounds
of states accordingly. Thus conditional probability distributions (CPDs) of the
form — the probability of B given A (p(B|A)), are used to encode the rela-
tionships between variables in the BN. For each node B, the likelihood that
the variable will be in each possible state given its parents’ node A states will
be dependent on domain knowledge acquired from the empirical study as well
as the frequency observed in both the measured variables and the simulated
dataset (see Fig. 6). This approach ensures a prior distribution is estimated
for the model parameters and used alongside those learned from data. This
will help minimize incorrectly assigned probabilities if possible combinations
are not observed in the training data (Gelman et al., 2014).
As an example, we considered a simple scenario of inferring the likelihood
that a user will welcome the automatic blocking of a third party cookie. Con-
sidering observation of recent actions taken by the user on the web browser,
example assumptions and reasoning that can be made here are that there
might be a 50% chance of a random user accepting to block 3rd party cookies
if the user is completing an online form requiring sensitive information, but if
the user is on a university campus, that probability will become 62% based on
observations of user behaviour in similar context. Moreover, in considering the
user’s profile information, if the user was female the likelihood might decrease
to 43%. Prior probability can also be indicated for a user based on age and
frequency of using specific security features of the web browser. Qualitative in-
puts in terms of the variables and their dependencies are generated by domain
knowledge and expert opinions. Quantitative data are subsequently generated
using data analysis and model simulation.
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Table 9 Cluster distribution of respondents showing cluster centres sorted by overall cluster
membership predictor importance
Cluster Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4
Description Highest cluster group
has high acceptability
of PAC
2nd highest cluster 
group has high 
intention to adopt 
PAC 
3rd highest cluster has
moderate acceptability
of PAC
The smallest cluster 
group has low 
acceptability of PAC
Size 31.8%
(122)
26.8%
(103)
23.4%
(90)
18.0
(69)
Inputs Acceptability
100%
Acceptability 
Intention(69.9%)
Acceptability 
60%
Acceptability
No intention (69%)
Self-Efficacy
µ=0.91
Self-Efficacy
µ =-0.9r0.84
B Self-Efficacy
µ =0.02
Self-Efficacy
µ =-0.16
Age 
25-34 (40.2%)
Age 
18-24 (100%)
Age 
25-34 (76.7%)
Age 
18-24 (63.8%)
Gender
Male (94.3%)
Gender
Female (100%)
Gender
Female (75.6%)
Gender
Male (91.3)
Environment
Corporate (56.6%)6
Environment
Home (100%)6
Environment
Home (83.3%)6
Environment
Corporate (39.1%)6
Evaluation fields ACB
µ =0.84
ACB
µ = -0.84
ACB
µ = -0.24
ACB
µ =0.07
PEOU
µ =0.45
PEOU
µ = -0.16
PEOU
µ =-0.26
PEOU
µ =-0.23
To identify homogenous groups in the data set, a Two-Step clustering that
is able to automatically determine the optimal number of clusters in a data set
was adopted. Respondents were first clustered based on their factor scores on
three acceptability variables determined from the PLS-SEM model (VFP, PU
and BI) with k-means clustering. The results show that the majority of our
participants have favourable consideration for PAC (Fig.5). The acceptabil-
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a Cluster 1 – high acceptability (100%) of PAC, score highest on self-efficacy and mostly
access the web using corporate (56.5%) and public (43.3%) networks and more likely to
have previously adopted a cybersecurity solution and found it user friendly.
b Cluster 2 – high intention to adopt PAC (69.9%) but scored the lowest on self-efficacy,
mostly access the web using home network and less likely to have previously adopted a
cybersecurity solution.
c Cluster 3 – Moderate acceptability (60%) with about 25% likelihood of rejection and
15% intention to adopt PAC. Moderate score on self-efficacy, mostly access the web
with a home (83.3%) and sometimes corporate (16.7%) network and less likely to have
previously adopted cybersecurity solutions.
d Cluster 4 – Low acceptability of PAC as 65.2% of these respondent group have no
intention to adopt PAC and only 34.8% indicated high intention to adopt PAC. Low
score on self-efficacy and access the web with all the three types of networks with about
39.1% likelihood for corporate, 33% likelihood for home and 27.9%. They are likely to
have previously adopted a cybersecurity solution and not found it user friendly.
Fig. 6 Visualization of cluster comparison
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Fig. 7 The qualitative representation of the LMID used for decision making in PAC with
priors based on data analysis
ity cluster membership was then combined with other adaptive cybersecurity
personalization variables (such as, context/environment, gender, age etc.) for
the Two-Step clustering and evaluated on self-reported previous use of cyber-
security tool (ACB) and PEOU. The results are summarized in Table 9 and
visualised with Fig 6.
The joint probabilities are then used to specify the CPTs. To make a predic-
tion from the BN, the model propagates the information at any given instance
based on its structure and prior/conditional probabilities and provides the
post-probabilities associated with the acceptability status (high or low) for a
particular cybersecurity task to be adapted to the user’s preference. Conse-
quently, the BN-based decision engine will take output probabilities from both
the context and user models as causal factors, together with the web browser
configuration log and security task models to make a prediction. A decision
status (e.g. block cookies, send alert or not) with an associated probability is
arrived at after information is propagated in the BN. If the “acceptability”
and “security need” probabilities are higher than a preset threshold, an auto-
mated security assistance in this scenario (auto block 3rd party cookies or a
preferred form of user alert) is provided for the user (see Fig. 7). Based on the
evaluation of the level of satisfaction with the automated assistance provided,
the user preference model is updated accordingly. Fig. 7 illustrates a person-
alized cybersecurity adaptive task limited memory influence diagram (LMID)
built using domain knowledge with records from the survey data analysis.
Evaluation starts with the BN built based on the proposed LMID which,
we refer to as the base BN. Next, data analysis is used to populate the CPT
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Fig. 8 The intermediate structure and CPT estimates for the Learned BN
of the base BN which is then used to generate a simulated data set. The
Learning wizard in the Hugin Software (Madsen et al., 2005)1 is then used to
automatically discover a new network called intermediate BN from the simu-
lated dataset (Fig. 8). Prior domain knowledge is then applied to resolve any
uncertainties that may be present in the intermediate BN structure. With the
discovered network and the generated database, parameter learning is carried
out to specify a new CPT for the ensuing network called learned BN (Fig.
8). Finally, the performance results for the originally proposed BN structure
are compared with corresponding BNs automatically discovered from both the
survey and simulated data sets. The comparison evaluates the model’s abil-
ity to produce applicable explanations in which relationships reflects adaptive
cybersecurity as a domain from which the data were generated (Shaughnessy
and Livingston, 2005). For prediction accuracy, we consider real usage sce-
narios in determining whether or not the levels of acceptability predicted are
plausible. A receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve is a fundamental
measure of a model’s performance for predicting specific states and the area
under the ROC curve (AUC) allows the quality of the model to be expressed
using a single value (Fig. 9). The analysis shows how well the predictions of the
built BNs match the cases in the dataset. All in all, the probability changes
among specified scenarios for the proposed BN parameters, were similar to
those obtained by the learned BN.
7 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
This research has two goals. One is to conduct an empirical study using a
behavioural science approach to determine the factors influencing users’ cy-
bersecurity behavioural decisions. The second is to illustrate how Bayesian
1 http://www.hugin.com
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networks can be built by integrating findings from empirical studies into the
ML approach of user and system modelling. To this end, a cybersecurity be-
havioural model was first introduced and empirically tested in this paper. The
effects of five attitudinal constructs on cybersecurity behavioural intentions
and behaviour were examined and in doing so, we (1) augmented the original
TAM model with additional dimensions – Perceived Risk, Value for Personal-
ization and Attitude towards Personal Data, and (2) evaluated the influence of
three sample demographic variables on cybersecurity behavioural intentions.
Although not all the hypothesized paths were found to be statistically signif-
icant, some interesting findings resulted from this study. The results suggest
that both security-related perceptions and general external factors contribute
to individual cybersecurity adoptive behaviour. The results also provide some
evidence that these factors are moderated by the user’s gender, age and the
environment within which the internet is mostly accessed. Following the test-
ing and verification of the behavioural model, those empirical findings were
combined with the ML technique of Bayesian-network modelling for the de-
velopment of a personalized adaptive cybersecurity framework. The research
illustrated the model framework for personalized adaptive cybersecurity assis-
tance.
The proposed behavioural model successfully explained most of the vari-
ance in the dataset. Similar to earlier studies (Alharbi and Drew, 2014; Venkatesh
and Davis, 2000), TAM proved to be a useful theoretical framework to ex-
plore and explain factors influencing individuals’ behavioural intentions to-
wards technological innovations. Although the study confirmed the direct and
indirect effects of some of the TAM constructs on cybersecurity behaviour,
some of our results are inconsistent with prior research findings,and warrant
further discussion. The results support prior empirical work that found a rela-
tionship between perceived ease of use, usefulness and behavioural intentions
towards technological innovations (e.g.(Lee, 2009; Yiu et al., 2007)). However,
contrary to suggestions from most prior studies that perceived usefulness is
the main determinant of usage intentions in other IS research contexts (e.g.
(Davis, 1989; Gefen et al., 2003; Jeyaraj et al., 2006)), our results show per-
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ceived ease of use has a greater influence in predicting behavioural intentions
in the context of cybersecurity.
Our results are however consistent with some previous studies that applied
the TAM to some online applications, finding a strong effect of perceived ease
of use on usage intentions and behaviour (e.g. (Castaneda et al., 2009; Gefen
and Straub, 2000; Mun and Hwang, 2003; O¨zkan et al., 2010). The original
TAM theorize PU have direct effect on behavioural intention while PEOU
indirectly influences the intention through PU, hence depicting PEOU as a
weak predictor of usage intentions. Our model, however, supports a direct
effect of PEOU on behavioural intentions and usage of cybersecurity, and
points to a greater significance of the ease of use factor in the context of
digital security. A possible explanation of this finding could be attributed to
the assertion that the effect of PEOU is dependent upon whether the type
of use is intrinsic or extrinsic to the technology (Gefen and Straub, 2000).
Thus, as our PEOU measured how easy the participant found it to learn and
configure the security settings of their preferred web browser, the types of
tasks involved here are intrinsic in that cybersecurity itself is an integrated
component of the web browser with an interface that delivers the desired
security and privacy control. Although our model did not support influence
of PEOU on PU as theorized in the original TAM, PU did have a substantial
impact on behavioural intention, which is consistent with extant findings in the
TAM literature. The results confirms the direct relationship between PU and
behavioural intention, though PEOU did not have a significant effect on PU
and the proportion of the BI variance accounted for by PEOU far outweighed
that of PU in our cybersecurity behavioural model. Also, PEOU is a significant
determinant of self-reported actual cybersecurity practised in this study, while
PU is a non-significant determinant. PEOU therefore provides a considerable
explanatory power in the context of cybersecurity usage among home computer
users.
Another major conclusion from this study that differs from the classical
TAM-related studies is the role of behavioural intention. Based on findings
from previous behavioural models, we had originally hypothesised that be-
havioural intentions will predict actual self-reported adoption of cybersecurity
mechanisms. However, contrary to what the extant literature suggests, our
dataset did not support this hypothesis, and upon further review, we realised
this finding is reasonable in our specific research context. This is because our
behavioural intention construct focused on personalized adaptive cybersecu-
rity (PAC) rather than general cybersecurity, and hence participants may not
yet have been exposed to it. Moreover, in the context of cybersecurity it is
generally logical to expect the inherent inexplicability of security to impede
actual usage though users may have intended to adopt available countermea-
sures. Thus factors such as complexity, inexperience and the secondary nature
of security configuration to web browsing in general tend to deter adoption and
usage of cybersecurity tools. Our findings however highlight the moderating
role of gender as the effect of BI on actual self-reported usage was significant
for males but not for females although the relationship was negative. More-
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over, the effect of PEOU on BI was much stronger for the female subgroup,
indicating that female netizens may be more hesitant to adopt difficult-to use
cybersecurity controls.
The results also suggest that the strongest predictor of self-reported ac-
tual usage of cybersecurity controls is the second order construct of atti-
tude towards personal data. Thus, participants who showed higher concern
for the collection and use of their personal data were more likely to have
attempted to, or actually adopted a cybersecurity countermeasure to ensure
their privacy/security online. Interestingly, the relationship between the APD
construct and BI to adopt personalized adaptive cybersecurity was negative,
indicating that users who are very privacy conscious are less likely to adopt
cybersecurity mechanisms that rely on their personal data to provide adaptiv-
ity. The relevance of the proposed BN framework is clearly supported by these
findings. The BN-based models complements available machine-generated data
(e.g. location, time, web logs, etc.) with domain knowledge data for the design
of an intelligent cybersecurity mechanism. This minimizes the need to actively
mine personal data to support prediction of acceptance of intended security
task to be automated. The BN can also learn from real usage experience data to
automatically update the probabilities when the inherent adaptability function
is executed in practice. Users will be more satisfied if automated cybersecurity
assistance provided is relevant to their primary cyber goals and delivered in a
manner acceptable to them based on appropriate factors influencing their per-
sonal preferences. This requires a complex decision-making process involving
predictive analysis of system and usage behaviour with a host of uncertain-
ties. Building the predictive model with a BN which has the inherent facility to
handle uncertainties will ensure a more effective provision of automated assis-
tance that meets differing users’ preferences compared to random automation
of security tasks.
7.1 Implications for theory and practice
This study has implications for both researchers and practitioners of cyber-
security. From a research perspective, the extension of the TAM explained
a significant amount of the variance in behavioural intention and adoption
of web browser security controls. The study validates the significant role of
user perceptions of ease of use, usefulness, risk, and personalization in predict-
ing individual’s intention to adopt PAC to achieve their security and privacy
goals while accessing resources in the cyberworld with their web browsers. As
discussed, the ease of use factor which is known to have a weaker influence
in the classic TAM literature, takes on a much more significant role when it
comes to cybersecurity control usage and intentions. This implies that indi-
viduals who normally disregard cybersecurity countermeasures may have the
intention of adopting PAC if they realize that it will be useful and easy to
do so. The study introduced additional constructs from protection motivation
theory and personal data research that better reflect the complex context of
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cybersecurity which encompasses digital security and privacy in its entirety.
The findings from the PLS-SEM generally support the importance of the ad-
ditional constructs, especially attitude towards personal data in predicting
adoption behaviour in the domain of cybersecurity. Consequently the find-
ings from the empirical behavioural study provide theoretical contributions in
the area of cybersecurity acceptance and usage. This is with respects to both
re-validation and extension of past theoretical framework as applied to the
new context of security behaviour modelling. The findings from this research
therefore add substantially to our understanding of cybersecurity behavioural
intentions and personalization dimensions.
The findings also have implications for practice and design as it can in-
form several aspects of improving the usability of cybersecurity mechanisms.
This study suggests that, cybersecurity mechanisms targeted at HCUs need
to be very usable with minimal demand on cognitive resources. The study
also endorses the value of incorporating data and privacy protection into sys-
tem design right from the onset, which are the underlining principles of re-
cent privacy-by-design projects. For instances both the new EU GDPR and
PRIPARE projects (Notario et al., 2015; Huth, 2017) highlight the need for
privacy-by-design. However, almost no direct comprehensive studies exist on
non-expert users’ privacy preferences towards adaptive cybersecurity in non-
corporate environments. Our proposed predictive model for providing person-
alization takes on individual’s disposition to their personal data into account.
This provides a framework for incorporating data privacy controls from the
design stage. In so doing, personalization is provided at the preferred level
for each individual. Thus, our design framework will facilitate the process of
determining and limiting access to such data that a user might consider too
sensitive in providing adaptive cybersecurity.
In summary, the contributions of the research presented in this paper are
both novel and significant paving the way for further empirical study on per-
sonalised adaptive cybersecurity in the public domain. As research exploring
the provision of PAC for HCUs is still in its infancy, the issues discussed in this
paper fill a fundamental gap in the current literature. The empirical approach
of PLS-SEM has been used to explore the statistical relationship between var-
ious cybersecurity behavioural input variables to predict two output variables
(BI and ACB). This provided essential insights into the specific issue of pre-
dicting user behavioural intentions toward the provision of PAC assistance. An
example BN-based framework is developed to illustrate how these insights can
be incorporated into building PAC user models. The BN is thus built using a
range of diverse input variables including behavioural, context and simulated
web browser features to demonstrate the provision of PAC in web browsers.
7.2 Limitations and future research
It is important to highlight the limitations of the studies presented in this
paper. Notably, generalization will need to be done with caution as the uni-
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versity students and staff were used as a convenience sample. The data set has
however been successfully used to provide empirical evidence for the usefulness
of predictive analysis of users’ behavioural data to the design of adaptive cy-
bersecurity. Although we had some measured data sets (such as self-efficacy),
observation data such as the actual level of user’s cybersecurity expertise and
security state of the browser were not available during the development of the
BN-based models. The data used for the BNs were thus obtained by simulating
aspects of the proposed framework. Therefore, the possibility that the result
may have some bias can not be overlooked. Nevertheless, the simulated data
provided a good indication of the likely percentage change to determine the
underlying trend that may be present in real-world data scenarios. Moreover,
the primary goal of this work is to demonstrate the incorporation of insights
gained from behavioural empirical studies into training machine learning mod-
els that can better support prediction and decision-making in the domain of
cybersecurity. This work represents a first-step towards the design and devel-
opment of a user friendly adaptive cybersecurity which adheres to the concept
of privacy-by-design. We also recognize that future research is needed to fully
evaluate the proposed BN-based models. This will require additional dataset
and further optimisation and testing before implementation. Although the
preliminary results using simulated data are promising, no real trial data was
available for a full validation. However, since our goal is to illustrate the fea-
sibility of the approach rather than validate, we sought to evaluate the model
on prediction accuracy. Thus considering real usage scenarios, we are able to
determine the underlying trends in predicting acceptability and usability with
the set of parameters identified.
Continuing with our combined approach of empirical studies and modelling
technique, we determined three future research directions. First, more broader
samples are required to replicate the behavioural model and validate inferences
that can be made based on either a PLS or Covariance-based SEM results.
Secondly, more factors that will influence cybersecurity personalization need to
be considered and their appropriate measure determined so they can be incor-
porated into the Bayesian network system. Third, the Bayesian-based models
need to be implemented in a prototype web browser for practical evaluation
of the function and further optimization with real sensory data.
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A Survey Instrument, Descriptions and References for Measured
Items
Part 1 – Demographic Profile/ External Variables
Essential for defining personal aspects of users in specific contexts (Lu et al., 2005; Jua´rez-
Ramı´rez et al., 2013).
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Individual Differences – Demographics Options
Gender
What is your gender?
A. Male
B. Female
C. Prefer not to say
Age
In which category is your age?
A. 18-24 years
B. 25-34 years
C. 35-44 years
D. 45-64 years
E. 65-74 years
F. 75 years or older
Education
What is the highest degree or level of education
you have completed?
If currently enrolled, mark the previous grade or
highest degree received.
A. 12th grade or less (no diploma)
B. High school diploma
C. Some college, no degree
D. Associate or technical degree
E. Bachelor’s degree
F. Graduate degree/professional
Employment Status A. Employed for wages
B. Self-employed
C. Out of work and looking for work
D. Out of work but not currently looking
for work
E. A homemaker
F. A student
G. Retired
H. Unable to work
Income
What category best describes your annual
household income?
A. Less than $10,999
B. $11,000 to $49,999
C. $50,000 to 99,999
D. $100,000 or more
Ethnicity
How would you classify yourself?
A. Arab
B. Asian/Pacific Islander
C. African/Black
D. Caucasian/White
E. Hispanic
F. Latino
G. Multiracial
H. Other:. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Physical Environment/Location
Please indicate how often you use a notebook
computer in the following locations.
A. Home:
B. Apartment Lounge:
C. Friend’s house:
D. Coffee Shop:
E. Students Residence Halls:
F. Classrooms/ Lecture Halls
G. Other:. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Experience and/or Frequency of use
The set of questions here will be used to deter-
mineusers level of experience with web browser
security settings as well as actualusage (Chang,
2004; Ng and Rahim, 2005).
How many times do you use web browsers during
a week?
A. not at all
B. once/week
C. several times/week
D. less than once/day
E. once/day
F. 2-3/day
G. bseveral times/day
Which of the following web browsers are you
most familiar with?
A. Internet Explorer
B. Google Chrome
C. Firefox
D. Other:. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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Which of the following web browser design do
you prefer and/or find enjoyable to use?
A. Internet Explorer
B. Google Chrome
C. Firefox
D. Other:. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
How often do you change security settings on
your web browser?
A. not at all
B. once/week
C. several times/week
D. less than once/day
E. once/day
F. 2-3/day
G. several times/day
Domain Knowledge(DK)
Adapted from Milne et al. (2009).
DK 1: I have hadsignificant experience with con-
figuring my browser security settings in thepast.
DK 2: I am knowledgeable about cybersecurity
and privacy related technologies.
DK 3: I am skilled at avoiding dangers while
browsing the internet
5-point Likert scale type strongly agree —
strongly disagree
Individual Differences – Descriptive Charateristics
SE and SBCL are PMT constructs used to examine the mediating effects of participant’s
protection motivation on cybersecurity behaviours. The set of questions here are used to
examine users level of experience with their preferred web browser as well as exposure to
web browser security issues and protection motivation levels (Chang, 2004; Ng and Rahim,
2005). SE items are adapted from the instrument developed and empirically validated by
(Compeau et al., 1999) while SBCL items are adapted from (Herath and Rao, 2009).
Self-Efficacy (SE)
I could optimise my web browser security settings . . .
SE 1: . . . if I had only the web browser manuals for reference.
SE 2: . . . if I had seen someone else doing it before trying it myself (Reverse Coded)
SE 3: . . . if there was no one around to tell me what to do as I go
Security Breach Concern Level (SBCL)
SBCL 1: Cybersecurity issues affects me directly
SBCL 2: Cybersecurity threats are exaggerated (Reverse Coded)
SBCL 3: I think cybersecurity issues should be taken seriously
SBCL 4: Security breaches are only targeted at organizations (Reverse Coded)
System Characteristics (SC) — SC assesses participants view on the user friendli-
ness of their preferred web browser and are measured using items from (Thong et al., 2002,
2004). The construct is used to elicit individual preferences in terms of the Design, Termi-
nology/ Language and Navigation of the browser security interface/ user interactions with
the following items:
IC 1: I understand the terms used on my preferred browser security interfaces
IC 2: Layout of the browser security interface is clear and consistent
IC 3: The sequence of screens for security settings are difficult to navigate (Reverse Coded)
IC 4: Security functions are well depicted by buttons and symbols
Part 2 (A) – User Perceptions (TAM & PMT)
Perceived Ease of Use (PEOU) – is “the degree to which an individual believes that using
a particular system would be free of physical and mental effort (Davis, 1989).” Likert type
statements were adapted from previously validated measurement inventory of TAM vari-
ables and rephrased for web browser security settings (Davis et al., 1989; Lu et al., 2014;
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Thong et al., 2002; Venkatesh and Davis, 2000).
PEOU 1: Learning to configure a browser security settings is easy for me
PEOU 2: Interacting with the interface for web browser security settings does not require a
lot of my mental effort
PEOU 3: My interaction with web browser security settings is clear and understandable
PEOU 4: I find it easy to optimise my web browser security to the level of protection I want
for my computer and privacy
Perceived Usefulness (PU) – which is also adapted from TAM’s scale items is the degree
to which a person believes web browser security settings would improve their protection
against cyber-attacks (Davis, 1989).
PU 1: Web browser security functionalities gives me greater control over my safety and pri-
vacy online
PU 2: Overall, I find browser security settings useful in protecting my computer from cyber
attacks
PU 3: Optimising my browser security settings gives me peace of mind when I am working
with the internet
PU 4: The sensitive nature of information I search for and/or store on my personal computer
requires me to optimise my web browser security settings
Perceived Risk (PR) – Questionnaire items for perceived risk was adapted from (Lu
et al., 2005). Their research findings indicate that perceived risk indirectly impacts inten-
tions to use an online application under security threats.
PR 1: Security functionalities embedded in web browsers are not adequate for preventing
cyber attacks
PR 2: It is important to optimise browser security when visiting sites that requires data
input
PR 3: I can make mistake whiles configuring my browser settings which can cause damage
to my computer
Value for Personalization (VFP) – in this study VFP refers to the level of appreciation
that a user has for all types of personalization possibilities within cyberspace. Items were
adapted from the value of online personalisation scale developed and validated by Chellappa
and Sin (2005).
VFP 1: I value online applications that are personalized based on information that is col-
lected automatically (such as IP address, pages viewed, access time) but cannot identify me
as an individual.
VFP 2: I value products and services that are personalized on information that I have vol-
untarily given out (such as age range, salary range, Zip Code) but cannot identify me as an
individual.
VFP 3: I value application interfaces that are personalized for the device (e.g. desktop, mo-
bile phone, tablet, etc.), browser (e.g. Internet explorer, Chrome, Firefox, etc.) and operating
system (e.g. Windows, Unix) that I use.
Part 2 (B) — Attitude to Personal Data (APD)
To minimize survey fatigue, the APD scale adopted from (Addae et al., 2017) is simplified
based overall cluster membership predictor importance of the APD factors as well as relia-
bility score of the measured items.
Protection
PDP 1: I regularly look out for new policies on personal data protection
PDP 2: I consider the privacy policy of institutions where I give out such personal details
PDP 3: I don’t always optimize my privacy settings when I create an online profile (Reverse
Coded)
Awareness
PDA 1: Such details about me are of value to external organizations
PDA 2: Researchers don’t need my consent to access my personal details (Reverse Coded)
PDA 3: Data collection organizations need to disclose the way the data are collected pro-
Exploring User Behavioural Data For Adaptive Cybersecurity 51
cessed and used.
Privacy Concern
PRI 1: I am sensitive about giving out information regarding my preferences
PRI 2: I am concerned about anonymous information (information collected automatically
but cannot be used to identify me, such as my computer, network information, operating
system, etc.) that is collected about me.
Part 3 — Cybersecurity Behavioural Intentions
Personalized Cybersecurity Adoption Intention (BI) — Items used to examine participants’
general attitude to personalized adaptive web browser security are adapted from (Lu et al.,
2014; Ng and Rahim, 2005).
BI 1: I am likely to accept personalized browser security update notification
BI 2: It is possible that I will allow adjustments to my web browser security settings to
improve my safety online
BI 3: I am certain that I will pay attention to cybersecurity alerts tailored to my personal
preference
Actual Cybersecurity Behaviour (ACB) – Items determining user interaction with web browser
security settings were selected and adapted from the list of strategies people adopt to protect
themselves online identified by (Rainie et al., 2013).
ACB 1: I have used service that allows me to browse the web anonymously
ACB 2: I don’t set my browser to disable or turn off cookies (Reverse Coded)
ACB 3: I regularly clear cookies and browser history while I use the internet
ACB 4: I sometimes encrypt my communications while using the internet
Part 4 - Components of personalization
Items were adapted from (Xu et al., 2008) to acquire participants’ ratings of the person-
alization dimensions identified for the purposes of building a BN-based model for adaptive
cybersecurity.
User preference
1. Please indicate the importance of the following user interface characteristics to be con-
sidered in personalizing your web browser security and privacy settings:
a Language
b Presentation style (popup, icon change etc.)
c Navigation style (buttons, drop down etc.)
d Level of Information (Detailed vs. simplified)
e Others (please specify)
Adaptive Cybersecurity
2. Please indicate the importance of the following characteristics of an adaptive cybersecurity
to be considered in personalizing your web browser security and privacy settings.
a User Effort Required
b Benefit of the security configuration
c Cost of the automated configuration
d Others (please specify)
Context
3. Please indicate the importance of the following contextual factors , which should be taken
into consideration in personalizing your web browser security and privacy settings.
a Browser Type
b Enabled Browser Extensions
c Location
d Time
e Others (please specify)
User Goals/Needs
3. Please indicate the importance of the following user actions, which should be taken into
consideration in personalizing your web browser security and privacy settings.
a Active Browsing session
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b Browser History
c Explicit security/privacy queries
d Previous acceptance of personalized cybersecurity
e Others (please specify)
